Posts Tagged ‘NGOs’

An essay I wrote for my 300-level (NZ = final undergraduate level) geopolitics paper.  The essay question was: Critically discuss what the Trans-Pacific Partnership can tell us about recent transformations in the international state system.  I received A+ for this essay.  Discussion or critique appreciated.  Please don’t steal my work (Turnitin will get you anyway).


The TPP evidences the substantial change in the international state system that has occurred in recent decades.  As a transnational agreement, it reflects a growing inclusion of global governance, rather than simply state sovereignty, as the means through which domestic policy is implemented.  Global governance is defined as a system of international coordination, based on multilateralism, and in which state sovereignty is not considered as important as integration (Heywood 2011).   In the pre-war and inter-war eras, and to a lesser degree under the Bretton Woods system, state sovereignty was considered practically absolute.  An examination of this legacy provides context, enabling the TPP to be understood as an important embodiment of modern global governance.  Though it is accepted that global governance diminishes the sovereignty of nation-states in the traditional sense, governments still utilise softer powers during negotiations in order to achieve their ends.

In order to understand the transformation in the international state system that the TPP demonstrates, the historical status quo must be considered.  It is most helpful to focus on economic relations, as this area is the one in which conflict might produce the most immediate and potentially serious consequences (Heywood).  Prior to WWI, and perhaps causing it (Heywood 2011), an imperial arrangement dominated the globe.  Within imperial systems, wealth is distributed very unevenly, concentrated at the centre (Baylis et. al. 2011)  A major causative factor of WWI was conflicting imperial interests.  The Depression of the 1930s then helped to feed political instability and extremism, culminating in WWII; protectionism was hereafter viewed unfavourably.  In 1944, at the UN Monetary and Financial Conference, it was decided that economic liberalism was the path to integration and the prevention of further crises.  Three organs were constructed, known collectively as the Bretton Woods System: the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  The IMF oversaw the stabilisation of exchange rates by pegging them to the U.S. dollar, and the U.S. dollar to gold.  The World Bank provided reconstruction loans to war-affected parts of Europe.  GATT aimed to reduce tariffs on a global scale.  All of these organs together provided regulation of global trade and finance, with a view to integrating and liberalising (Baylis et. al.).  This is an early example of the kind of multilateralism exhibited in today’s system of global governance; an international agreement aimed at avoiding conflict, for which member states are required to surrender some sovereignty.  However, as will be discussed further on, the states involved in designing the system also had national interest in mind, and were merely pursuing their policy objectives through means other than the exercise of sovereignty . 

The Bretton Woods system remained functional until 1971, when President Nixon announced his New Economic Policy (U.S. Dept. of State 2013); after the system’s collapse, multilateral agreements continued to be popular.  The American dollar had become overvalued primarily because of military spending, and President Nixon unpegged the dollar from the value of gold.  Exchange rates were floating from this point on, so the organs of the Bretton Woods System could not fulfil their original purposes.  However, multilateralism was on the rise, and the organs adapted.  The IMF became somewhat of a watchdog for financial transparency; the World Bank turned its focus to developing nations in need of loans, and the GATT became the World Trade Organisation in 1995.   Along with these central multilateral bodies, regional trade and security agreements began to spring up frequently after the end of the Cold War.  Rosecrance (1991), from a realist perspective, argues that this was primarily due to the collapse of bipolarity.  By 2010, 462 regional trade agreements were known to the WTO (Heywood 2011).  This was the same year in which the TPP was entered into by New Zealand, Brunei, Chile and Singapore. 

The TPP demonstrates, in several ways, this gradual shift from an inter-war era of protectionism and strict exercise of state sovereignty.  Although the TPP negotiations themselves are not publicly released, and thus an analysis of individual parties’ conditions can only be performed to the extent that leaked documents reveal anything, the programme and locations of meetings, et cetera, are available.  The first noteworthy point is the lack of a supranational authority involved in the TPP negotiations.  The states involved in negotiating the TPP are surrendering some national sovereignty in order to make concessions; whereas in bygone eras, nations did not consider integration a primary goal, and as such exercised total sovereignty over domestic policy.  However, even though some sovereignty is being conceded, there is no larger power that coordinates these nations. While the WTO will require that the agreement is recorded, it does not have any binding power over states, so to speak (Heywood).  The WTO cannot be considered supranational for this reason.  The agreement exhibits multilateralism, as it is based on negotiations and agreement rather than authority.  Similar to earlier examples of multilateralism, such as NAFTA, the negotiations themselves are even moved around to different localities to create more of a sense of fairness and inclusion. 

The second notable way in which the TPP demonstrates global governance is the considerable involvement of transnational corporations, and, less influentially, other NGOs.  There are more than 600 TNCs involved in the negotiating rounds of the TPP (Citizens Trade Campaign 2014).  This reflects a “hollowing out” of the state in an upwards direction.  TNCs are involved in the agreement at the expense of members’ state sovereignty, because they are powerful enough to negotiate their preferred outcomes.  As Herod (2009) explains, TNCs are able to virtually dictate the financial environment of many states, because governments desire their investment.  They may demand tax breaks or amendments to labour legislation.  Thus, there is no denying the significance of TNCs as global actors which are, in some cases, more powerful than entire countries.  Multilateralism involves input from many more parties than just the traditional nation states; it includes TNCs and other NGOs.  Despite the restriction of TPP negotiations, the attendees of these rounds is sometimes public knowledge, and NGOs on a local level have been shown to have been included.  On April 20, 2012, First Union General Secretary Robert Reid stated in an interview for TVNZ’s Breakfast show that his organisation had had a presence at the most recent round of negotiations in Auckland, in an advisory capacity.  The Hon. Murray McCully also stated in the House on December 6th, 2010:

“MFAT has called for submissions from NZ interests in relation to TPP…the discussions underway in Auckland at the moment are open in the sense that there are over 100 national and international interest groups…”(inthehouseNZ 2010)

This demonstrates that along with an upwards “hollowing out” of the state, global governance operates on more regional and local levels.  This is an inherent trait of the system; unlike the earlier state-centric approach of government, governance is very versatile, and a single negotiation can involve multi-level input, from local to global. 

It is true that literature concerning the TPP is highly speculative, considering the confidentiality of the agreement.  A commonly cited protest to the TPP (It’s Our Future.co.nz 2012, New Zealand Herald 2013) is that it compromises state sovereignty.  While, as aforementioned, global governance as exemplified by the TPP is considerably less state-centric than earlier approaches to international relations, it is not necessarily true that sovereignty itself is under threat.  Baylis et. al. argue that this is irrefutably the case.  These authors cite the considerable involvement of TNCs in global governance as an insurmountable barrier to state sovereignty.  Uncontrollable cross-border financial flows, triangulation and problems of extraterritoriality of TNCs and their subsidiaries are given by way of explanation.  In the traditional sense of the term ‘Westphalian sovereignty’, that is, absolute sovereignty, these issues do pose a problem in terms of necessity for the state to consult with and consider other parties.  However, Herod and Heywood both take the opposite stance.  States, it is argued, may still maintain sovereignty through the strategic employment of such ‘soft power’ methods as negotiation, example and the establishment of trust. 

Insofar as sovereignty can be understood as the ultimate ability to implement policy, states are still able to do this within a system of global governance.  Two examples are relevant here: firstly, the U.S.’ motives in the original establishment of the Bretton Woods System; and secondly, that same nation’s intent regarding China and the TPP.  The U.S. was pursuing its maxim of economic integration in 1944 with the aim of expanding its hegemony.  John Maynard Keynes, of the U.K. delegation, had originally suggested that one of the supposed organs should have the power to hold large lender states accountable for ‘loan-sharking’, should smaller economies default on unreasonable debts.  The U.S. was able to completely negotiate this provision out of the agreement.  While Baylis et. al. make the point that states are unequal, and smaller ones have no hope of defending their sovereignty, it has been seen in the leaked Intellectual Property Rights provision of the TPP (Wikileaks 2013) that New Zealand disagrees with America over something in that section; and the Hon. Murray McCully stated in the House on December 6th, 2010 (inthehouseNZ), that the government is not prepared to negotiate on the status of Pharmac.  It is therefore clear that, despite being a small state, the NZ government believes it has reasonable bargaining clout in the negotiations.  In another example of soft power exercise, it is argued by Kelsey (2013) that the U.S. intends to either isolate China from its Asia-Pacific trading partners by joining the TPP, or to force China to join and agree to American provisions.  Either way, both of these nations will be required to make some policy concessions, but will not be so isolated that they will be forced to accept unfavourable outcomes.  With a lack of bipolarity and a variety of regional trade communities, both the U.S. and China will have other, albeit perhaps less lucrative, opportunities.  As such, both are free to pursue policy objectives in the negotiations, but will fall short of being able to blackmail one another.

The TPP is a convenient vehicle through which to understand the recent changes to the international state system, as these are most easily conveyed from an economic perspective.  The pre- and inter- war eras, from imperial beginnings, emphasised the significance of the nation-state and the sovereignty thereof. The implementation of the Bretton Woods System was the point of change after which multilateralism began to replace this state-centric approach.  Despite the collapse of Bretton Woods in the 1970s, global governance – as opposed to government – gradually became more salient, particularly after the end of the Cold War; and this system is prevalent today, employed on both macro and micro levels, from the global marketplace to local councils.  Advisory groups, business interests and states all cooperate to achieve the most mutually beneficial end possible.  The TPP evidences the involvement and power of TNCS; the inclusion of small NGOs; and the ability of states to employ ‘soft power’ methods to achieve policy goals.  It is this ability that circumvents the proposal that states are losing sovereignty under the global governance model.












Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens, P. (2011). The globalisation of world politics. Oxford, England: Oxford     University Press.


Citizens Trade Campaign. (2014). The Trans-Pacific Partnership Free Trade Agreement: NAFTA for the Pacific Rim?. Retrieved from http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/trade-policies/tpp-potential-trade-policy-problems/


Goodwin, M. (2009). Governance. in R. Kitchin and N. Thrift (Eds.), International Encyclopedia of Human Geography (pp. 593-599). Oxford: Elsevier.


Herod, A. (2009). Governing Globalization: Geographies of Globalization. Malden, MA, Oxford and West Sussex UK: Wiley-Blackwell.


Heywood, A. (2011). Global politics. Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan.


inthehouseNZ. (2010, December 6). Question 1: Russel Norman to the Minister of Trade [Video file].  Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LICeK6xizro


Jane Kelsey: TPPA end game can only come from dirty compromises. (2013, Nov. 29). New Zealand Herald. Retrieved from http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=11164328


Kelsey, J. (2013). US-China relations and the geopolitics of the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA). Third World Resurgence, No. 275. Retrieved from http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-china-relations-and-the-geopolitics-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-tppa/5357504


Rosecrance, R. (1991). Regionalism and the post-Cold War era. International Journal XLVI. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/40202895?uid=3738776&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104253025633


U.S. Dept. of State. (2013). Nixon and the end of the Bretton Woods System, 1971-1973. Retrieved from http://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/nixon-shock


Wikileaks. (2013). Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) – IP Chapter.  Retrieved from     https://wikileaks.org/tpp/




Grade: A+

This is an excellent essay. It shows a clear understanding of the international state system and the concepts we use in the course to understand its transformation and you integrate this successfully with a good sense of the TPP. The essay is well constructed and well written and you show the ability to make use of examples in appropriately nuanced ways. I’m glad to hear you are considering postgrad study! Great work.



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The following post is an essay written for class about the development of civil society organisations in China and Japan.  This is a really interesting topic because it’s changing before our eyes, and will tell us a lot in the future about whether or not there’s a specific Asian democratic development model.  On the other hand, if you don’t care about that, then don’t read the post!  🙂

Civil Society Organisations are gradually becoming more significant and influential around the world, and especially in the Asia Pacific, which is experiencing a general democratic transformation.  However, East Asia faces unique challenges regarding the growth of these organisations and the maintenance of transparency and effectiveness in the same.  These challenges are the result of specific cultural and political aspects that have shaped the societies of these nations throughout history.  The following essay is a comparative analysis of the development of CSOs in both Japan and China; the problems they face in these countries; and the likelihood of their influence increasing to a level on par with CSOs in the modern Western world.

Although Japan and China have experienced very different ideological influences throughout their histories, we can identify a similar period of democratic growth in both countries; although of course this a general global trend also.  Dr. Wang Yizhou, of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, outlines three main stages of transition in modern China, which can be observed to correlate chronologically to Japan.[1] The first stage is the period from the 1940s to the end of the 1970s, under the rule of Mao Zedong.  In Japan, this approximate stage was a period of one-party dominance under the LDP (which did continue beyond the 1970s, but was influenced then by other factors).  The second stage in China outlined by Dr. Yizhou is the interim period after Mao’s death in 1976 until the beginning of the 1990s, during which the populous demonstrated the development of a political conscience.  This period in Japan was characterised by a similar economic boom and outside political influences causing legislative change.  The  third period in China is after 1992, following the incident at Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, coupled with economic flourishing.  In Japan, this period comprised the first general election in which the LDP lost power, along with law changes allowing civil society a much greater autonomy.  In order to understand the development of CSOs in these countries, it is necessary to examine each of these periods in detail.

Prior to the late 1970s, CSOs on a national level were almost unheard of in both Japan and China.  Mao Zedong’s leadership of the Chinese Communist Party prohibited civil activity.  No interests were allowed to be embodied independently of the state.  This being said, as remains the case today, small village groups were not checked in gathering to pray together and maintain a local temple, or to identify with a common lineage.  Although village officials existed, they were not overly concerned with such inconspicuous gatherings, as their attention was focused on siphoning village funds or securing their own advancement in the CCP.  This laxity is likely a characteristic of a very large population with a centralised government; the power and concern of the CCP did not reach right to the rural outskirts in a particularly intimidating form.

In Japan during this period, little civil activity occurred; as Professor Robert Pekkanen argues, this period of one-party dominance was one of history’s strongest in terms of the state-encouraged, submissive Japanese psyche.[2]  In the 60s and 70s, some small CSOs and student movements did appear without any government backlash as would be expected inChina, but they were simply not paid attention to.  This small movement of disorganised – mainly environmental – groups was not paid particular heed by the public either, who did not like to be heard espousing a cause that the state did not support, due to this submissive mindset investigated by Professor Pekkanen.  Some CSOs persisted into the 1980s, but most had insignificant life-spans.

The second period in these countries’ democratic transition was one of great economic change.  China’s CCP was unofficially factionalised, and different members were competing for influence.  Mao Zedong died in 1976, along with some other prominent CCP members and supporters, and this was viewed according to the common Chinese political philosophy as the death of the “First Generation” of great leaders.  Hua Guofeng, successor of Mao, was less authoritarian and traditional.  During the 1980s, China’s economy was exposed to international influence and mobilised massively.  Conservative officials began to see democratic mobilisation as a threat, perhaps expecting it to occur as wealth and influence became more available to a growing middle class.  Deng Liqun, minister of the propaganda department, was one such official and was quoted in 1983 as labeling China’s derivation from Mao’s communist method as “a quagmire of decentralism, selfish departmentalism and individualism”.[3]  Deng Liqun promoted the idea that a holistic, communist approach must be taken towards conflicts of interest.  Increasingly paranoid, he also launched a campaign against jingshen wuran, or spiritual pollution.  “Things that look new,” he warned, “may not be the new-born things of socialism”.  This was an initiative to discourage the growth of independent civil society.  Many so-called civil society groups did exist in China, but were entirely state-funded and controlled, even down to membership.  In this way the state provided an illusion of civil society, changing its purpose to celebrating the civil freedoms already ‘allowed’ by the state rather than expressing dissatisfaction with them.  Still, despite the CCP’s effort, this era of political destabilisation did encourage civil activity; students in particular were the mobilising force.  Protests were generally broken up by the police with only moderate violence and no fatalities.  However, the death of Hu Yaobang in1989, a liberal CCP politburo member who sympathised with students, is regarded as the main catalyst for the June the Fourth incident at Tiananmen Square.  Protesters and bystanders were massacred in a government crackdown.  This, coupled with a new level of economic prosperity in the early 1990s, triggered a debate abut civil society and enabled slightly increased autonomy of CSOs.  A law passed  in 1987 aiming to prevent the corruption of village officials also allowed for far greater democratic administration at the local level.

In contrast, Japan during its ‘second stage’ was much more tolerant of civil activity, following a gradual trend from the previous decades.  The difference was that CSOs were not brutally disbanded, but rather ignored entirely, or used as publicity vehicles for bureaucrats.  The bureaucracy of Japan at this time was massively far-reaching (though not comparable with that of china), and to set up a CSO one had to apply for various permissions from a senior bureaucrat.  Even once established, the organisation was subject to any control imposed by that bureaucrat, and the bureaucrat would often use the CSO to his political advantage.  The practice of amakudari (senior officials ‘retiring’ into organizations or business in advisory roles) also served as a mechanism of control.  As such, it was very difficult to set up an autonomous civil organisation.  Many groups existed that were under the wing of various factions, such as farmers’ collectives and religious groups who made donations to politicians.  These were certainly not the unbiased civil organizations that Maruyama Masao, the prominent Japanese political theorist, had advocated in the 1940s; his ideal democratized society comprised “free assembly in diverse groups of varied structure, with competition between them”.[4]  While there was competition, it was not their own, but rather the embodiment of factional politics.  Change began to occur in the 1980s, when American investment exposed Japanese businesses and government to foreign CSOs that wanted donations.  In 1995, the Hanshin earthquake in Kobe was met with a relief effort seen by many as inadequate on the government’s part.  CSOs took advantage of this opportunity to contribute, and out-performed the government.  Subsequent public debate inspired much-increased participation.  CSOs in 1990s Japan enjoyed a growing autonomy.

The third period of democratic transition in Japan and China occurred from the late nineties onwards.  1997 was a key year for this development in China, although change had really started to occur in 1992 after the collapse of the Soviet Union– the failure of that regime caused the CCP to reflect on its own governance.  Deng Xiaoping, a conservative politburo member who was suspected of having ordered the crackdown atTiananmen Square, died in 1997 along with several other notable “Second Generation” leaders.  As the death of Mao had done, this signaled a period of change in Chinese politics as Deng and his companions could no longer influence the party under the guise of retirement.  Proof of the significance of this is the massive growth in CSO registry that occurred in 1997.  The CCP passed a reactionary law in 1998, the Regulations on Management of Civil Charities, which sought to define civil society (though still very strictly) and provide for its legitimate existence.  Under the new regulations, CSOs still had to register with the relevant department, and could not undertake any activity that might be deemed offensive to social morality or contrary to party policy.  However, now at least they could avoid bureaucratic interference for the most part if they so chose.  As is explained below, although CSOs in China still grapple with institutionalisation, they have shown themselves to be nearly autonomous in recent years.

Japan’s ‘third stage’ occurred after 1999, when legislative change allowed CSOs to register under a new category which limited bureaucratic involvement in their establishment.  The reason for this is less clear than those that caused change in China; however, Robert Pekkanen cites a growing need to provide for an aging population in a nation with a limited welfare state.  The legislation was also passed only four years after the country’s CSOs proved their worth in the Hanshin quake relief effort.  Furthermore, the new non-LDP administration were more liberal and could be said to have encouraged civil activity for the reasons cited by Pekkanen; CSOs are valuable societal contributors and can work in partnership with governments, lightening their workload. CSOs inJapantoday have only to overcome the hurdle of government factionalism before they can be considered completely self-governing.

The current and future prospects of CSOs in China and Japan look to follow a democratic trend, growing away from state influence and taking a more active role in society.  Today, China’s CSOs are able to act sometimes in accordance with their own mandates; although, as Dr. Yizhou points out, there are still some points of view which are very sensitive with the CCP and might result in the organisation being audited or voided.  Larger CSOs in Chinaare still subject to government negotiations in order to avoid being seen as a threat.  This allows the CCP to maintain some control.  Moreover, the practice of chuan xiaoxie, literally “giving someone tight shoes to wear”, is still a bureaucratic tool in China; this implies bureaucrats making life difficult for those participating in undesirable civil activity, by restricting sick pay, withholding raises, et cetera.  Membership is still sometimes managed by government departments. China also refuses to take a role in international initiatives to develop CSO effectiveness.  However, a promising action of the CCP has been to offer tax incentives to CSOs who do not use any state funding.  This indicates a possible willingness to relinquish control.

In recent years, large CSOs have suddenly demanded greater concessions from the government.  Four of China’s most significant environmental organizations have had considerable influence on National Peoples’ Congress discussions, eliciting greater consideration of ecological issues in policy, and collectives of landlords in urban areas have rallied successfully against demolition that would destroy their livelihoods.  All things considered, it seems that although progress is slow, Chinese civil society is definitely developing autonomy.  Two opposing schools of thought dominate Chinese discourse about their own civil society; one group argues that China will follow a general democratic trend and CSOs will gain autonomy; the other argues that state-controlled civic activity is just a reality of China, and evidences itself throughout history.[5]  Yizhou claims that the consensus on the way forward forChina is to advance civil society but not in a “Western Way”, as this will cause “turmoil like Tiananmen”.  This seems too vague to be effective.  If China aims to retain its regime, it must openly and transparently define its goals regarding civil society, relinquish autonomy to it, but may maintain socialist propaganda.  In this way it can greatly reduce the likelihood of protest, but still espouse its ideologies.  Positive reinforcement will create a better attitude among the Chinese public towards the continuation of socialism; incentives are more effective than punishment. A totally authoritarian state will not survive in contemporary China; it can choose to ride the democratic wave to its advantage, or fail.

Japan has a less monumental challenge ahead, although not uncomplicated.  Today, Japanese CSOs still have trouble remaining independent due to two primary factors; the difficulty of engaging the public, and the factionalised politics of the country.  The public inJapanis taught from a young age to learn by rote and not question authority, an aspect of a Confucian social hierarchy; thus the public is difficult to mobilize in civil activity. However, this traditional problem is slowly becoming less significant with the increase of democratic civics inJapan.  The second problem is less likely to solve itself organically; Japanese politics has always been, and remains, very prone to factionalism.  Even with the one-party-dominant state under the LDP out of power, factions are rife among local and central party bodies.  Perhaps it has now become too ingrained a tradition to remove, or perhaps it will gradually devolve as transparent democracy takes hold.  The result of factionalism regarding CSOs, however, is that they are frequently used by the bureaucrats that approve them as a propaganda tool.  Factional leaders must gain the public’s favour by appearing socially conscious.  Pork-barrel politics also make use of CSOs, as a local MP backed by a faction, for example, can unite with an organisation to do relief work, in order to gain public support. Still, despite these roadblocks, CSOs in Japan now have significant influence. Japan takes an active role in discussing the international ‘Istanbul Principles’ (of effective CSO development and governance), having a council that convenes annually to discuss this progress.

Current trends in China and Japan indicate a shift in approaches towards CSOs; more tolerant policy in the former, and more inclusive and legitimising policy in the latter.  Over three identifiable stages of democratic transition in the latter half of the twentieth century, these countries both experienced a gradual tilt towards democratization and a free civil society.  It could be argued that they are simply following a broader global trend, as is embodied in movements like the Arab Spring; however, this is too simplistic an approach.  Indeed, although they both fit a broad pattern (as does the rest of Pacific Asia), they are not completely in line and arrived at their current status quo through very different circumstances.  The emphasis, in any case, should not be on the idea that both nations will eventually drift into a transparent democracy, but rather on the fact that each must respond in a fitting way to its own situation; and that China and Japan may need to maintain some level of state control over civil society, simply in order for it to function in an East Asian context.  The concept of civil society and CSO activity is growing momentum in East Asian universities, becoming increasingly popular (and tolerated) as a thesis topic.  The future will reveal what path these two countries will choose to take.

Word Count: 2,650.


Kersten, R. (1996) Democracy in Post-war Japan: Maruyama Masao and the Search for Autonomy. London: Routledge.

Pekkanen, R. (2004) After the Developmental State: Civil Society in Japan.  Journal of East Asian Studies, 4 p.363-388.

Shi, T. (1997) Political Participation in Beijing. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Yizhou, W. (2005) Civil Society in China: Concept and Reality. Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Burton, C. (1990) Political and Social Change in China since 1978. Connecticut: Greenwood Press Inc.

Japan Association of Charitable Organisations (2008) Present state of CSOs sustaining Japanese civil society. [online] Available at: http://www.kohokyo.or.jp/english/images/200906civicus.pdf [Accessed:13/05/12].

[1] W. Yizhou, Civil Society in China: Concept and Reality, Chinese Academy ofSocial Sciences, Beijing, 2005.

[2] Pekkanen, R. (2004) After the Developmental State: Civil Society in Japan. Journal of East Asian Studies, 4 p.363-388.

[3] C. Burton, Political and Social Change in China since 1978, 1990, Greenwood Press Inc., Connecticut, US.

[4] R. Kersten, Democracy in Post-war Japan: Maruyama Masao and the Search for Autonomy, 1996, Routledge, London.

[5] W. Yizhou (as previously referenced).

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